Posted September 2, 2025
By Alec Marcus
Truthfully, I don’t have all the answers for what makes an NBA championship team.
I’ve never been inside an NBA locker room or worked for an organization, and admittedly I’m not an encyclopedia of all 79 NBA Finals series. But on the surface, like many of us, I can understand what makes a successful NBA team. I mean basketball is a pretty simple game at its core, right?
2 baskets, 94 feet apart. 1 ball. 5 players on each side at a time. Score on your opposing basket and prevent scores on your basket. Offense, and defense.
A team with a strong offense and a strong defense should outscore its opponents more times than not and thus become a winning team. One should be able to take from that logic that a team with a top offense and a top defense will outscore its opponents more frequently and win even more games, thrusting them well into contention for the league championship.
That’s my topic for discussion in this piece.
Given NBA basketball is a timed game, you can say the field for performance is limited to just those 48 minutes of play. If we were to theorize that offense and defense have equal weights for a team’s performance (surely a discussion for another day), you could envision their offense and defense as two circles – sort of like pie charts.
The highest-performing teams would be strong enough to fill both of their pies for the 48 minutes of play, giving them both a winning offense AND a winning defense.
For reasons outside my field of study, I can’t say that I know for certain why some NBA teams are deliberately ignoring this logic. Ignoring the basic principles of its game and just focusing on winning one side of the equation.
I’m not here to rip into those teams ad nauseam, but I am here to uncover their biggest mistakes and their oppositions’ great success, with careful consideration for the players. Because in the NBA, when you’re allocated any number of the 48 minutes, you can either be a winning player or you can be a losing player, and it may not even be your fault…
On the All-Star level, there’s not a more polarizing player for this discussion than Trae Young.
Young continued to prove himself as an offensive superstar this season, leading the league in assists (11.6) and finishing top-15 in scoring (24.2 points). With the freedom to be the pass-heaviest and shot-heaviest player on the Atlanta Hawks, Young was surely a winning player for them on offense. Though it’s no secret the undersized and relatively-grounded Young offered next to nothing on the other end – a blatant losing player for them on defense.
This is where you would make that argument (some of you so passionately want to make) that Trae Young isn’t a winning player, because he is giving up all the points on defense that he gives to his team on offense. Yet from a player-first perspective, Young would say his defensive drawbacks are limited because of the players sharing the court with him.
Enter Dyson Daniels – the best defensive guard in the NBA. The Hawks’ Young-Daniels backcourt paired a top-of-the-line offensive guard with a top-of-the-line defensive guard, emphatically filling both their respective pies. And since Daniels was admirable as both a complementary scorer and playmaker, the Hawks’ offensive pie became over-filled, giving the team a net-positive or winning backcourt.
If their frontcourt and bench can also be winning units, the Hawks will win lots of games and find themselves in the playoffs.
On the supporting star level, let’s look at two breakout performers in 2025 with Austin Reaves and Christian Braun.
Reaves made his biggest leap yet as a highly-productive offensive player (20.2 points and 5.8 assists) and as a respectable defensive player. Once the Lakers resolved their bleeding point guard situation with superstar Luka Doncic, Reaves gave them a very over-stuffed offensive pie. Only when the Timberwolves exposed the void within the pair’s defensive pie did Luka spend an entire offseason working on his conditioning, in his quest to help the Lakers to a winning backcourt they did not have.
Braun doubled his offensive output (15.4 points) in his first season as a starter. Given his top-of-the-line efficiency (58.0% shooting), he set him and Jamal Murray up to have another healthy offensive pie. Similarly the pair’s shortcomings on defense showed in back-to-back seven-game series, forcing the Nuggets to make substantial changes to its frontcourt since they’re married to their flawed Murray-Braun backcourt.
As for complementary players, few shined brighter than NBA Finals combatants Aaron Nesmith and Lu Dort.
Nesmith was top-of-the-line efficient on offense (50.7% shooting, 43.1% from 3-point), and his toughness on the defensive end made him an above-average piece there as well. In a half-game role, his proficiency and high-energy makes him a winning player altogether. The offensive inferno and defensive force that was his Indiana Pacers made Nesmith one of the highest-performing players per-minute in the NBA, fueling their joint trip to the NBA Finals this past June.
Dort was top-of-the-line dominant on defense (First Team All-Defense, 4th in Defensive Player of the Year voting), and his elite floor spacing (2.4 3-point makes on 41.2% shooting) make him a commodity on the other half. As a starter held to just under 30 minutes per contest, his lockdown D and dependable three-pointer make him another winning player altogether. The two-way powerhouse Oklahoma City Thunder helped make Dort one of the highest-performing role players in the NBA, leveraging his limited skills into an NBA championship.
Bench players are often overlooked for their contributions, just ask Ty Jerome and Russell Westbrook.
Jerome was one of the highest-performing Sixth Men in the league (12.5 points in only 19.9 minutes), though his efficiency (51.6% shooting, 43.9% 3-point) made him a truly elite bench player. Throughout his playing career he has always played best with a defined role as combo floor general/spark plug, and that’s exactly what his Cleveland Cavaliers have called on him to be. As an off-the-bench performer, Jerome can easily be described a winning player who practically covers the reverse unit’s offensive pie all by himself.
Westbrook produced so much output as a Sixth Man (11.4 points, 5.2 assists, 3.9 rebounds) that his Denver Nuggets eventually called on him to be their regular fill-in starter, something they were likely aiming to avoid when they signed him for a veteran’s minimum. Historically he has been berated for not being a complete player with shaky shooting and erratic defensive play, but those problems no longer jeopardized his team’s chances coming off-the-bench and playing just half the time. Westbrook became a winning player, making countless plays on both ends to make headway with each reserve unit’s pies.
Helping the Sixth Men out are specialists who provide chunks for at least one of those pies, players like Naz Reid and Steven Adams.
Reid cashed in this summer after another superb season as a bench scorer (14.2 points on 46.2% shooting, 37.9% 3-point). The 6’9” and husky center has had far greater success as an offensive weapon than as a viable rim protector, positioning him best as stalwart Rudy Gobert’s complement rather than his frontcourt partner. The Minnesota Timberwolves have converted Reid into a highly-sought-after winning player, who did a lot to stuff the reserve unit’s offensive pie while still leaving room for others to perform.
Adams received a late-season extension for his profound impact as a defensive stopper (5.6 rebounds, 0.5 blocks in just 13.7 minutes). The 6’11” hulking center stood out as a fearsome rim protector who didn’t offer much of anything with his post-up game, positioning him best as post-up star Alperen Sengun’s complement, rather than his frontcourt mate. The Houston Rockets established Adams as their winning center off the bench, who in a quarter’s time did enough as a rebounder and shot-contester to make meaningful contributions to the reserve unit’s defensive pie.
Alright, that’s enough pie for now.
It is also worth noting that some groups performed extraordinarily well when a batch of winning players compounded on one another.
Cason Wallace, Alex Caruso, and Kenrich Williams were all winning players as defensive specialists, who together made the Thunder’s strong defense a truly disruptive force. Taurean Prince, A.J. Green, and Gary Trent Jr. were all winning players as shooting specialists, who when paired with the game-breaking Giannis Antetokounmpo made the Bucks’ offense lethal in spurts. Cam Whitmore, Tari Eason, and Amen Thompson were all winning players in some capacity, who in conjunction made the Rockets bench a top-of-the-line crew.
As I mentioned earlier in this truly player-first piece, players are not always at fault for their underperformance. We’ve seen how it takes both the correct amount of minutes and a fit surrounding cast to create winning opportunities for a player, even if they’re not a well-rounded player. Those not so lucky because of poor coaching or roster building were subjected to losing opportunities this past year, even if they were some of the most talented players in the entire NBA.
Underperforming All-Stars in 2025 include Devin Booker, Bam Adebayo, and Domantas Sabonis.
Booker took massive step backs in terms of shooting proficiency (-3% field goal and -3% three-point shooting) in a year which he stood to actually take a step forward. His Phoenix Suns offense was set up for disaster with no suitable point guard or gifted center. Booker became an infamous losing player even next to Kevin Durant with below-average shooting relative to his shot diet and well-below-average defense in the halfcourt.
Adebayo was a regressor too with worse offensive output (-4% field goal shooting, -1.2 points) once it was finally his time to be the top guy. His hard-leaning defensive Miami Heat team had little cohesion offensively, with a first-time point guard and no consistent outside shooting. Adebayo was made out to be a losing player with a flawed scoring game away from Jimmy Butler, and his defensive even took a dip as well.
Sabonis took a considerable slip as a playmaker (-2.2 assists) at a time when he had been getting MVP consideration. He played on the miserable Sacramento Kings team with awful shooters and no rim protection. Sabonis was positioned to be a losing player with capped offensive upside as a second scorer and capped defensive performance as the de facto shot contester.
As for supporting stars, few big-names underperformed like DeMar DeRozan and Paul George.
DeRozan was one of those inept floor-spacers on the Kings (32.8% 3-point shooting) making life difficult for Sabonis in the driver’s seat. Conversely Sabonis and gus same shooting-challenged teammates were especially troubling for the small forward’s game, who made his money as a attacking scorer inside the three-point line and at the rim. DeRozan was set up to be a losing player in his massive 35.9 minutes per game without the spacing he needed to perform, and the 35-year-old didn’t add anything to help the team’s defensive woes either.
George was downright dreadful in his lackluster 2025 campaign for a myriad of reasons (-5.6 points, -4% shooting, -6% 3-point). The Sixers badly needed a secondary star to replace Joel Embiid and the $200 million man fell flat on his face, clearly with the intention to not play that role anymore. George’s wildly inconsistent and underwhelming offense made him an obvious losing player over 32.5 minutes per contest, who really only performed well on the defensive end.
Speaking of big salaries, the discussion surrounding losing opportunities is greatly concerning when it costs NBA players tens of millions of dollars, and that very well coudl be the case for complementary players Gradey Dick and Jerami Grant.
Dick entered the starting lineup and alarmingly took a step backward with his proficiency (-1.5% field goal shooting, -1.5% 3-point) despite getting more run with better players. The sophomore would likely argue that his Raptors teammates didn’t give him any help with no consistent point guard play, no offensive center, and a well-below-average shooting frontcourt led by Scottie Barnes. Dick at just 21-years-old became a losing player in the starting lineup with subpar offensive output to go along with his absentee defensive game.
Grant fell way down the team’s priority list and it resulted in much worse performance over the season (-6 points, -8% field goal shooting, -4% 3-point). The Trail Blazers began to shift their focus to developing Scoot Henderson and Shaedon Sharpe despite the costs, leaving their highest-paid player without any rhythm in an increasingly-crowded frontcourt. Grant became one of the most obvious losing players in basketball with god-awful efficiency, and with it washed up most of his effort as a previously strong defender.
For Sixth Men to hurt must be legitimate malpractice, but that’s precisely what happened with Cole Anthony and Jonathan Kuminga.
Anthony came alive with several 30-point outbursts and enjoyed much more run as a spot starter, however he was held to career-lows in minutes (just 18.4) and points too (9.4, first time ever not in double digits). The Magic leaned heavily into the weak shooting of Jalen Suggs and Anthony Black for their point guard play, costing the fifth year spark plug ample opportunity to heat up and take over games. Anthony was made to be a losing player because his time with the ball was minimized to a career-low and he was already prone to lapses between his standout defensive plays.
Kuminga became a playoff star after a season marked by disassociation from the coaching staff, forcing falloffs in key shooting metrics (-7% field goal, -2% 3-point, 8% free throw). The Warriors were playing Gary Payton II, Quinten Post, and Trayce Jackson-Davis far more willingly, signaling to the rest of the league they were frustrated with the fourth-year’s development and intensity. Kuminga is merely a losing player for the fact he took better shots away from specialists, on a team that particularly needed to be efficient there.
But it is worse when complementary players are so ineffective that they make you question why they weren’t specialists to begin with, and that was the case this past year with Tyus Jones and Keyonte George.
Jones took a painful step backward when he suffered in his first regular stint as the point of a competing team (-4% shooting, -1.8 points, -2.0 assists). The Suns planned for sky-high offense with the famously-sharp distributor feeding a trio of all-time scorers, however that was far from what took place, which was more of the team scoring by committee without that historically-shrewd efficiency. Jones was very much a losing player as a starter so now he’s resorting back to his all too familiar specialist bench role, one that had originally made him a top performer in his class.
George was one of the most unstable performers in the NBA, barely altering his efficiency despite an uptick in usage (+0.00% field goal on +3 shot attempts, +1% 3-point on +2 shot attempts). The league-worst Jazz had been intrigued by the high scoring potential from their second-year guard, only until his wildly up-and-down shooting did they firmly plant him back in the reserves. George was a distant losing player as a starter who could find similar success to Jones, as a scoring specialist coming off the bench who soon could be pacing his peers.
Just as some groups performed very well when a batch of winning players compounded on one another, the opposite is also true when several losing players further inhibited one another.
Coby White, Zach LaVine, and Nikola Vucevic for all their success offensively as Bulls starters were clearly losing players on defense, combining to let up endless blow-by’s and crushing any chances of the team making the playoffs. Suggs, Black, Kentavious Caldwell-Pope, and Wendell Carter Jr. were all losing players offensively for the Magic, complicit in holding back Franz Wagner and Paolo Banchero from greater shooting seasons and likely more wins. Vasilije Micic, Nick Smith Jr., and Tidjane Salaun were all losing players together taking too many bad shots on the Hornets bench, instead of deferring to more savvy veterans.
No matter how much talent you might have on your NBA roster, you will only perform the best if you meet the game’s crucial components by having a strong offensive team and strong defensive team. The manner for meeting those criteria is putting your players in winning situations. The most important factors for doing so are measuring their skill and effort, weighing their proficiency with regards to minutes, and placing them in groups with a favorable supporting cast in order to maximize their individual game.
The only way to truly overcome that logic is to have a bona fide megastar, someone who alters the scales on both ends and contributes enough at an elite level to mask the faults of their teammates. That is why the Murray-Braun backcourt can be winners playing with Nikola Jokic, why the Thunder’s average offense can be winners playing next to Shai Gilgeous-Alexander, and why the Warriors middling performance on both ends can play out like winners beside Steph Curry.
Since those players are few and far between, the best way to project the next wave of winning players and losing players is to see who changed out uniforms in the offseason. The Cam Johnson-Michael Porter Jr. swap is a perfect example of NBA teams turning losing players into winning players.
The Nuggets weren’t getting enough output and defensive effort on a regular basis to move forward (no pun intended) with the MPJ-Aaron Gordon full-time frontcourt, and had actively been looking for a way to change it out for something more consistent and routinely committed. The Nets weren’t getting enough offense in general with their frontcourt and badly wanted to change it out for higher upside plays. Cam Johnson as a Nugget now paired with Aaron Gordon beside Jokic should certainly be enough to fill both frontcourt pies, whereas Michael Porter Jr. joining the Nets is at the very least a tremendous lift for any of the team’s offensive pies.
The Jordan Poole-CJ McCollum trade is another example of a good trade, one that aims to strengthen two emerging groups.
The Wizards were trying to put together a safer offensive attack, willing to sacrifice a high ceiling for a more consistent scorer. The Pelicans were conversely trying to load up on ammunition, allowing themselves to be more susceptible to off nights if it meant they would play host to more outbursts. McCollum brings Washington much closer to a healthy offensive pie beside the young Bub Carrington, and Poole helps New Orleans to potentially a healthy offensive pie by covering all aspects with the efficient slasher Dejounte Murray.
In free agency, several newcomers are due to become winning players too.
Anticipate John Collins to re-emerge as a winning player for the first time since his Hawks days, helping stuff both the offensive and defensive pies beside two-way superstar Kawhi Leonard in the Clippers frontcourt. Expect Myles Turner to become a truly winning player on the defensive sliding in to make plays beside Giannis Antetokounmpo in the Bucks frontcourt. And imagine Jordan Clarkson returning to greatness as a much-needed winning Sixth Man in the Knicks shallow bench.
I don’t foresee Dennis Schroder’s defense helping Zach Lavine to a winning backcourt on the Kings, nor do I predict Kelly Oubre Jr. offering enough of the good stuff offensively beside Paul George to form a winning frontcourt on the Clippers. And most of us believe that Deandre Ayton was signed to be a winning offensive center with Luka and LeBron James, rather than being a rim protector who could stuff the Lakers’ defensive pie.
The difference between winning and losing in the NBA is meeting or not meeting the most crucial components of the game. The Western Conference Champion Thunder were an elite defense with a strong offense, whereas the Eastern Conference Pacers were their exact opposite asn an elite offense with a strong defense.
Both teams were successful filling up their two pies from the backcourt to the frontcourt to the center position down to the bench unit. And because of that, each of their groups were capable of winning sixteen playoff games for the ultimate prize: the NBA championship.
Easy as pie.